In this paper we study the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents, each of which has a privately known valuation of receiving the service from the sets, i.e., being covered by some set. Each set is assumed to have a fixed cost. We develop several approximately efficient strategyproof mechanisms that decide, after soliciting the declared bids by all elements, which elements will be covered, which sets will provide the coverage to these selected elements, and how much each element will be charged. For single-cover set cover games, we present a mechanism that is at least 1 d max -efficient, i.e., the total valuation of all selected elements is at least 1 d max fraction of the total valuation produced by any mechanism. Here d max is the maximum size of the sets. For multi-cover set cover games, we present a budget-balanced strategyproof mechanism that is 1 dmaxH dmax -efficient under reasonable assumptions. Here Hn is the harmonic function. For set cover games when both sets and elements are selfish agents, we show that a cross-monotonic payment-sharing scheme does not necessarily induce a strategyproof mechanism.
Introduction

Motivations and Background
In the past, an indispensable and implicit assumption on algorithm design for interconnected computers was that all participating computers (called agents) are cooperative: they will behave exactly as instructed. This assumption is being shattered by the emergence of the Internet, as it provides a platform for distributed computing with agents belonging to independent and self-interested organizations, who may diverge from the prescribed algorithm to maximize their own benefits. This gives rise to a new challenge that demands the study of algorithmic mechanism design, the sub-field of algorithm design under the assumption that all agents are selfish (i.e., they only care about their own benefits without consideration for the global performances or fairness issues) and yet rational (i.e., they will always choose their actions to maximize their benefits).
A standard economic model for the design and analysis of scenarios in which the participants act according to their own self-interests is as follows. Assume that there are n agents {1, 2, · · · , i, · · · , n}, and each agent i has some private information t i , called its type. For example, an agent could be a bidder in an auction, and its type is its valuation of an auctioned item. For direct-revelation mechanisms, the strategy of each agent i is to declare its type, and it may choose to report a carefully designed lie to influence the outcome of the game to its liking. For any vector t = (t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t n ) of reported types, the mechanism computes an output o as well as a payment p i for each agent i. For each possible output o, agent i's preference is defined by a valuation function v i (t i , o). The utility of agent i for the outcome of the game is defined to be u i (o) = v i (o)+p i (o).
An agent is called rational, if it always picks its best strategy to maximize its own utility. If the strategy picked by an agent is the best strategy regardless of what other agents do, the strategy picket by the agent is called the dominant strategy. A vector of strategies (where each agent picks a strategy) is called a Nash equilibrium if no agent can deviate from its chosen strategy to improve its utility when all other agents keep their strategies unchanged. Obviously, a strategy vector where each agent chooses a dominant strategy is always a Nash equilibrium. A mechanism is incentive compatible (IC) if reporting its type truthfully is a dominant strategy for every agent. Another commonly desired property for mechanism design is individual rationality: the agent's utility of participating in the output of the mechanism is at least the utility of the agent if it did not participate at all. A mechanism is called truthful or strategyproof if it satisfies both IC and IR properties.
A classical result in mechanism design is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism by Vickrey [20] , Clarke [5] , and Groves [9] . The VCG mechanism applies to maximization problems where the objective function g(o, t) is simply the sum of all agents' valuations. A VCG mechanism is always truthful [9] , and is the only truthful implementation, under mild assumptions, to maximize the total valuation [8] . Although the family of VCG mechanisms is powerful, it has its limitations. To use a VCG mechanism, we have to compute the exact solution that maximizes the total valuation of all agents. This makes the mechanism computationally intractable for many optimization problems.
This work focuses on developing new mechanisms for strategic games that can be formulated as different variants of the set cover problem, with three main objectives. First of all, each mechanism has to be strategyproof by providing incentives (such as payments made by service-receiving agents, or service receivers, to service-providing agents, or service providers). In addition, we aim to achieve the following objectives, which are sometimes at odds with each other and thus require proper tradeoffs. Value Efficiency: To make mechanisms tractable, we have to adopt approximation algorithms that compute only approximately optimal outcomes. We say that a mechanism is α-value-efficient (or α-efficient for short) if its output achieves a total valuation at least α times the optimal total valuation for all outcomes that permit strategyproof mechanisms. For VCG mechanisms, replacing the exact algorithm with an approximation algorithm usually destroys incentive compatibility [16] . In this case, we shall design new mechanisms that preserve incentive compatibility.
Observe that the value of the game defined here is different from the traditionally used social welfare in the literature. The social welfare of a solution A is defined as the total valuation of the elements served by A, minus the total cost of service providers in A. Although our mechanisms will not directly maximize the social welfare of the selected service providers and the served elements, in our mechanisms, a set is selected to provide service only if its cost is at most the total valuation of the elements to be served by this set. Budget Balance(BB): Frequently, a game involves a set of agents (service receivers) who are willing to pay for receiving services, and the mechanism needs to decide, based on the valuations of the services reported by all agents, the subset S of agents who shall receive services and how much they are charged. Let C(S) be the total cost incurred by providing services to all agents in S and ξ i (S) be the cost charged to each agent i ∈ S, then cost-sharing method is
e., the cost of providing the service is recovered from the agents.
Competitiveness if i∈S
, no surplus is created from the payments of agents. Competitiveness exists very often in practice due to the reason that if there does exist surplus, a competitor of the service provider can further reduce the price to attract the agents.
If a cost-sharing method satisfies both cost recovery and competitiveness, it is budget-balanced, i.e., i∈S ξ i (S) = C(S). It has been proved to be impossible to achieve both budget balance and efficiency [15] simultaneously. Thus, we may seek a β-budget-balanced cost-sharing method such that i∈S ξ i (S) ≥ β · C(S), for some 0 < β < 1. Here, β is known as the budget balance factor.
Fair Cost-Sharing: Budget balance is only a measure of how good the costsharing method is from a global point of view. We also need to address how individual agent would view the cost-sharing method; we need to make the method fair, encouraging agents to participate. In this paper we will consider the following fairness measures [17] : cross-monotonicity (i.e., the cost share of an agent should not go up if more players require the service), and fairness under core (i.e., the cost shares paid by any subset of agents should not exceed the minimum cost of providing the service to them alone, hence they have no incentives to secede). We also will design mechanisms that avoid free-riders. Here a served element is free rider if its payment is less than certain shared value computed using some method. No Positive Transfers (NPT): The cost share by every element is non-negative. Voluntary Participation (VP): The utility of each agent is guaranteed to be non-negative if an element reports its bid truthfully. Consumer Sovereignty (CS): When an agent's bid is large enough, and others' bids are fixed, the agent will get the service. In this paper, we focus on designing strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy at least the following properties: NPT, VP, and CS. Among mechanisms satisfying these properties, we want to design mechanisms that will find a set of service providers (and a corresponding charge to each of the served elements) to (approximately) maximize the valuation of served elements. Certain fairness among served elements will also be considered.
Set Cover Games
A set cover game can be generally defined as the following. Let S = {S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S m } be a collection of multisets (or sets for short) of a universal set U = {e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e n }. Element e i is specified with an element coverage requirement r i (i.e., it desires to be covered r i times). The multiplicity of an element e i in a set S j is denoted by k j,i . Let d max be the maximum size of the sets in S, i.e., d max = max j i k j,i . Here n j = n i=1 k j,i is the cardinality of set S j . Each S j is associated with a cost c j . For any X ⊆ S, let c(X ) denote the total cost S j ∈X c j of the sets in X .
Many practical problems can be reasonably formulated as a set cover game defined above. For example, consider the following scenario: a business can choose from a set of service providers S = {S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S m } to provide services to a set of service receivers U = {e 1 , e 2 , · · · , e n }.
• With a fixed cost c j , each service provider S j can provide services to a fixed subset of service receivers. • There may be a limit k j,i on the number of units of service that a service provider S j can provide to a service receiver e i . For example, each service provider may be a cargo company that is transporting goods to various cities (the service receivers), and the amount of goods that can be transported to a particular city daily is limited by the number of trains/trucks that are going to that city everyday.
• Each service receiver e i may have a limit r i on the number of units of service that it desires to receive (and is willing to pay for). The outcome of the game is a cover A, which is a subset of S. The mechanism of the game is to determine an optimal (or approximately optimal) outcome of the game, according to a pre-defined objective function. For example, for set cover games where the sets are considered to be selfish agents whose total cost is to be minimized [14] , the mechanism needs to compute a cover A opt with the (approximately) minimum cost c(A opt ), among all covers A such that
There may be different variants of games according to various conditions (with different objective functions):
1. Each service receiver e i has to receive at least r i units of service, and the costs incurred by the service providers will be shared by the service receivers. 2. Each service receiver e i declares a bid b i,r for the r-th unit of service it shall receive, and is willing to pay for it only if the assigned cost is at most b i,r . 3. Each service provider S j declares a cost c j , and is willing to provide the service only if the payment received from elements is at least c j .
Related Work
Devanur et al. [6] studied the strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms for set cover games, with elements considered to be selfish agents. In a game of this type, each element will declare its bid indicating its valuation of being covered, and the mechanism uses the greedy algorithm [4] (referred as greedy mechanism hereafter) to compute a cover with an approximately minimum total cost. When every element needs to be covered at most once, i.e., r i = 1 for each e i , Devanur et al. proved that the greedy mechanism is BB and strategyproof, and satisfies VP, NPT, and CS. In the meanwhile, Devanur et al. also showed that the greedy mechanism is neither cross-monotonic nor group strategyproof. Here a mechanism is group strategyproofness if for any group of agents who collude in revealing their valuations, if no member is made worse off, then no member is made better off. For general set cover game where each agent may request cover for multiple times, the greedy mechanism is not strategyproof anymore. The cross-monotonic property plays an vital role in set-cover game since, given any cross-monotonic sharing method, one can explicitly designs a budget balanced and group strategyproof mechanism that satisfies NPT, VP, and CS by using the Moulin-Shenker mechanisms [15] . However, the cross-monotonic property does have its limitations [10] . Immorlica et al. [10] provided bounds on budget balance factor for cross-monotonic cost sharing schemes. More specifically, Immorlica et al. [10] showed that there is no cross monotonic cost sharing scheme for the set cover game that achieves budget balance factor greater than O(
, where d max is the maximum number of elements can be covered by any set.
Li et al. [14] extended the work of Devanur et al. [6] by providing a strategyproof cost-sharing mechanism for multi-cover games. They also designed several cost-sharing schemes to fairly distribute the costs of the selected sets to the elements covered, for the case that both sets and elements are unselfish (i.e., the will declare their costs/bids truthfully). The case of set cover games where sets are considered as selfish agents was also considered.
Besides the budget balance issue, the efficiency or value efficiency issue is also critical in the set cover game. Although generally, the efficiency is defined as the cost incurred by the sets and the valuations of the elements should be traded off in an optimal way, there are different definitions that may lead to different outcomes. One common definition of efficiency is to require a mechanism to choose a subset of the elements to maximize the social welfare, where the social welfare is defined as the total valuation of the elements minus the total cost of the sets selected. Several literatures [1, 2] have ruled out the existence of mechanisms that satisfy strategyproofness and budget balance, and maximize social welfare simultaneously. Moreover, Feigenbaum et al. [7] showed that no strategyproof mechanism can recover α fraction of the maximum social welfare and β fraction of the incurred cost simultaneously for any pair of constants α and β for the fixed-tree multicast. Recently, Roughgarden et al. [18] proposed to define the efficiency as minimizing the social cost, where social cost is the sum of incurred cost of the sets plus the valuation of the elements that do not receive the service. Under their definition, they showed that there exists a mechanism that achieves strategyproofness, budget balance, and approximately minimizes social cost for several games including the Steiner tree problem.
Our Results and Organization of Paper
In this paper, we approach the question of multiset multi-cover set cover problem from a different perspective. We design greedy set cover methods that are aware of the fact that the service receivers or the service providers are selfish and rational. It still remains a challenge to study the case when both the service receivers and the service providers are selfish and rational. When the elements to be covered are selfish agents with privately known valuations, we first show that the strategyproof mechanism designed by a straightforward application of cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme is not α-efficient for any α > 0. We then present a strategyproof charging mechanism such that the total valuation of the elements covered is at least 1 dmax times that of an optimal solution. This mechanism, however, may have free-riders: some elements do not have to pay at all and is still covered. We continue to present a strategyproof mechanism without free-riders and it is at least
When the sets are also selfish agents with privately known costs, we show that the cross-monotonic payment-sharing scheme does not induce a strategyproof mechanism: a set could lie its cost downward to improve its utility. This is a sharp contrast to the theorem proved in [15] that a cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme implies a strategyproof mechanism for selfish elements. The positive side is that the mechanism is still strategyproof for elements, i.e., no element can lie about its bids to improve its utility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some general properties of the set cover games when the elements (also called service receivers) are selfish. In Section 3, we present a strategyproof mechanism for selfish receivers and we prove that the mechanism is approximately efficient. We then extend our results for the case that the elements may have multiple coverage requirement in Section 4. In Section 5, we study the scenario when both the service providers (i.e., sets) and the service receivers (i.e., elements) are selfish agents. We show that a cross-monotonic payment-sharing scheme does not induce a strategyproof mechanism. In Section 6, we present our simulation results that demonstrate the efficiencies of the mechanisms presented in this paper. We conclude our paper in Section 7 with the discussion of some future works.
Selfish Service Receivers
Typically, the objective function of a game is defined to be the total valuation of the agents selected by the outcome of the game. In set cover games, when sets are considered to be agents (e.g., [14] ), maximizing the total valuation of all selected agents is equivalent to minimizing the total cost of all selected sets. However, if the elements are considered to be agents, the objective becomes to maximize the total valuation of all elements (i.e., the sum of all bids covered). Correspondingly, we need to solve the following optimization problem:
Problem 1 Each element e i is associated with a coverage requirement r i as well as a set of bids
An assignment A is defined as the following: This problem is NP-hard. In fact, the weighted set packing problem, which is NP-complete, can be viewed as a special case of this problem, with r i = 1 and b i,1 = 1 for each e i and cost c j = |S j | (the cardinality of set S j ) for each S j . Therefore, the VCG mechanism cannot be used here if polynomial-time computability is required. In the rest of the paper, we concentrate on designing approximately efficient and polynomial-time computable strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy some properties such as NPT, VP, and CS. Note a mechanism needs to compute a family of sets as assignment, the number of times that each of the elements will be served, and the charge to each of the served elements.
All our methods follow a round-based greedy approach. Let A grd be the current family of sets chosen by our greedy approach. Initially, A grd = ∅. In each round t = 1, 2, · · · , we select some set S jt to cover some elements. We will describe how we select the set S j t for each round in detail later. After the s-th round, we define the remaining required coverage r i of an element e i to be
r=1 b i,ri−r i +r and it is affordable after s-th round if v j ≥ c j . One scheme to solve the preceding proposed problem is to select a set S j as long as it is still affordable, and assign all appropriate bids to S j . However, in this case an element may find it profitable to lie about its bid, as we will show in Section 3. An alternative scheme is to pick a set only if it is individually affordable, as defined as the following:
Definition 1 A set S j is individually affordable by d bids of elements contained in S j if it contains at least d elements each with a bid value at least
Consequently, only the d largest bids are assigned to S j , for the maximum d such that S j is individually affordable by d bids. Notice that here an implicit assumption is that each set S j can selectively provide coverage to a subset of elements contained by S j . This is to prevent anybody from taking "free rides." In essence, this scheme is contradictory to our objective of maximizing total valuation. We throw away bids that can otherwise be assigned (without incurring any extra cost) to a set. Further, we may discard an affordable set with a value much greater than its cost (see Theorem 1). However, to achieve strategyproofness while avoiding free riders, it is somewhat another form of "price of anarchy", i.e., the amount of suffering to a society due to lack of coordination in a game 1 . The following lemma gives upper bounds on the total value lost by enforcing individually affordable sets: 
This proves Theorem 1.1. Theorem 1.2 can be proved similarly.
The bound is tight, as we can have a set with a cost of 1 + , and with d max bids 
Single Cover Games
In this section we first study the case where each element only needs to be covered once, i.e., r i = 1 for each e i ∈ U . This corresponds to the traditional set cover problem.
An obvious solution to designing a strategyproof mechanism for single-cover set cover games is to use a cross-monotone cost-sharing scheme based on a theorem proved in [15] : a cross-monotone cost-sharing scheme implies a groupstrategyproof mechanism when the cost function is submodular, non-negative, and non-decreasing. A cost function C is submodular if
For set cover games, it is not difficult to show by example that the following cost functions are not submodular: the cost c(A opt ) defined by the optimal cover A opt of a set of elements, and the cost defined by the traditional greedy method (i.e., in every round we select the set S j with the minimum ratio of cost c j over the number of elements covered by S j and not covered by sets selected before)
2 . Even if a cost function is submodular, sometimes it may be NP-hard to compute this cost, and thus we cannot use this cost function to design a strategyproof mechanism.
It was shown in [14] that there is a cost function that is indeed submodular: for each element e i ∈ T , we select the set S j with the least cost that covers e i (Least Cost Set, or LCS). Let A lcs (T ) be all sets selected as above to cover a set of elements T . Then c(A lcs ) is submodular, non-decreasing, and non-negative. Notice that, if it is a multi-cover set cover game, each set S j is only eligible to cover an element e i k j,i times.
Given the cost function c(A lcs ), it was shown in [14] that the cost-sharing
, is budget-balanced, crossmonotone and in a 1 2n -core. Here κ j,i is the number of bids of e i assigned to S j . For a single-cover set cover game, based on the method described in [15] , given the single bid b i by each element e i , we can define a mechanism M (ξ) as in Algorithm 1. T outcome is computed as the limit, denoted byŨ (ξ, b), of the following inclusion monotonic sequence:
and the charge by M (ξ) to an element e i is ξ i (Ũ (ξ, b) ).
Algorithm 1 Mechanism for single cover games via cost-sharing.
The charge by M (ξ) to an element e i is ξ i (Ũ (ξ, b) ).
The following theorem is directly implied by the result in [15] .
Theorem 2 The mechanism M (ξ) is group-strategyproof, budget-balanced, and meets NPT, CS, and VP.
However, this mechanism is not efficient at all: we will show by example that it is possible that the total valuation achieved by this mechanism is 0 while the maximum total valuation achieved is a positive number. In other words, this mechanism cannot be α-efficient for any α > 0. Figure 1 illustrates such an example. It is easy to show that no element will be selected by mechanism M (ξ). On the other hand, if we choose S 2 to cover elements {e 1 , e 2 } and charge each elements 1 2 · c 2 = 2, each element has a positive utility and the game has its maximum total valuation 3.5 + 2.5 = 6. Observe that, for this special game instance, the solution that uses set S 2 to provide services to elements e 1 and e 2 (and charge them each 2) clearly has properties of NPT, CS and VP.
Note that the social welfare achieved by the mechanism M (ξ) is 0, while the social welfare achieved by the preceding simple solution is 6 − 4 = 2. Then the above example shows that the mechanism M (ξ) is not social efficient also, i.e., for any number α, M (ξ) cannot guarantee that the social welfare achieved by M (ξ) is at least α fraction of the optimum mechanism for all possible game instances.
Next, in Algorithm 2, we describe a new greedy algorithm that computes for a single cover game an approximately optimal assignment A grd . Starting with A grd = ∅, in each round t the algorithm adds to A grd a set S j t with the maximum effective value.
Algorithm 2 Greedy algorithm for single cover games.
compute effective value v j . 4: end for 5: while S = ∅ do pick set S t in S with the maximum effective value v t .
7:
A grd ←A grd ∪ {S t }, S←S \ {S t }. 8: for all e i ∈ S t do 9: π(i, 1)←t.
10:
remove e i from all S j ∈ S.
11:
end for 12: for all S j ∈ S do 13: update effective value v j .
14:
if v j < c j then
15:
S←S \ {S j }. 16: end if 17: end for 18: end while
The following theorem establishes an approximation bound for the algorithm.
Theorem 3 Algorithm 2 computes an assignment A grd with a total value
Proof. Let S k be a set selected by A opt (with some assigned bids). Before Algorithm 2 adds any set to A grd , S k is affordable. When the algorithm finishes, no more set in S \ A grd is affordable, and therefore at least one bid assigned to S k in A opt must have been assigned to a set in A grd (which could be S k itself).
Let S a k be the first set in A grd that takes bid(s) assigned to S k in A opt . Consider the current value v a k of S a k and the current value v k of S k right before S a k is added into A grd . Since till now no set in A grd has taken a bid assigned to S k in A opt , v k should be at least the assigned value ν k (A opt ) of S k in A opt . However, by the greedy nature of our algorithm,
This way, we can "charge" the assigned value ν k (A opt ) of each set S k ∈ A opt to a set S a k ∈ A grd with at least the same assigned value. Since each set in A grd can only take bids assigned to at most d max sets in A opt (and hence be charged at most d max times), the total value V (A opt ) of A opt is at most d max times the total value V (A grd ) of A grd .
It is easy to show that the above bound is tight by constructing an example. Next we show how to compute the payment charged to each element in a strategyproof mechanism. In many problems, the total payment is often less than the total cost incurred by the service providers in order to guarantee strategyproofness and therefore the mechanisms are not budget-balanced. However, it is important to note that even in this scenario we still want to guarantee that the total valuation of the service receivers covered by any particular service provider is at least the cost of this service provider; otherwise it is not worthwhile to select this service provider in terms of the social efficiency. When the mechanism runs into deficit, it is traditionally assumed that there is an outsider banker (e.g., the government) who will subsidize the costs of the sets.
The payment p i,1 of each bid b i,1 can be decided according to Algorithm 3 using a round-based approach. Algorithm 3 examines all possible cases that an element e i can lie about its bid b i,1 while still ensuring that b i,1 is assigned to a set in A grd , and charge e i the minimum bid value in all these cases.
Intuitively, Algorithm 3 runs Algorithm 2 without the participation of e i (i.e., not including b i,1 when evaluating the value v j of each S j e i ). As e i is "watching" the set selection process, every time a set S t is picked, it would record for each set S j e i , how much it needs to raise its bid b i,1 so that S j can beat S t in this round (so that S j is selected and consequently b i,1 is assigned), as shown in Line 16 of Algorithm 3.
Just like in Algorithm 2, we maintain a priority queue containing all sets using their weights as keys, so that in each round we can extract the set with the maximum value. However, when a set S j e i becomes unaffordable (because of losing bids to sets already picked), we need to handle it differently. In this case, e i has to raise its bid b i,1 at least to c j − v j ; otherwise S j will still not be qualified to be selected. To beat a set S t being picked, e i might have to raise its bid even further, a situation already handled in Line 16. On the other hand, with a value equal to c j , it may already be sufficient for S j to get picked; in this case, e i does not need to report a bid more than c j − (v j − b i,1 ). This is handled in Line 12.
We have the following theorem on the above cost-sharing mechanism:
Theorem 4 The cost-sharing mechanism defined in Algorithm 3 is strategyproof.
Proof. It is easy to show that Algorithm 3 actually computes the minimum bid that an agent can report such that it is still selected in the outcome if it is originally selected. Since the set-cover game is a binary demand game [11, 13, 3] , in which each element is either selected or not, and Algorithm 2 satisfies the monotonicity property (if an element is selected with a bid b, then it will be selected with a higher bid) defined in [11] , the result proved in [11] implies that Algorithm 3 is strategyproof.
Notice that Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3 together may produce an output such that the payment by a certain element is 0. For example, see the set cover game illustrated by Figure 2 (a) . It is easy to show that, according to Algorithm 3, the payments by both elements e 1 and e 2 are 0 since each element can lie its bid to as low as 0 and still get covered. To avoid this zero payment problem, we use a slightly different algorithm to determine the outcome of the game. Our modified greedy method (described in Algorithm 4) instead only selects individually affordable sets. When a set S j is added into A grd , the algorithm only assigns to S j the largest d bids, such that S j is individually affordable with d bids, for the maximum such d.
Obviously, Algorithm 4 satisfies the monotone property defined in [11] : when an element e i was selected with a bid b i,1 , then it will always be selected with a bid b i,1 > b i, 1 . This monotone property implies that there is always a strategyproof mechanism using Algorithm 4 to compute its output. It is easy to show that Algorithm 4 is a round-based greedy method that satisfies the crossindependence property defined in [11] . Thus, the payment to each element can always be computed in polynomial time. The algorithm that computes the payment in polynomial time is omitted here due to space limit.
We have the following theorems on the approximate value-efficiency of the modified greedy algorithm: 
Here H x is the harmonic function, i.e., H x = 1 +
x . Therefore, to bound the value v k of each S k ∈ A opt , we split it into two different parts and bound them separately: the partṽ k is no more than ν a k (A grd ), and the remaining part v k −ṽ k (which is exactly the sum of the bids
Now consider each set S q ∈ A grd . It is assigned with no more than d max bids that are assigned to different sets in A opt , and therefore may be charged at most d max times for its assigned value ν a k (A grd ). Further, for each of its assigned bids b z , S q may be charged for d max times b z , if b z is assigned to a set in A opt . Therefore, in total each S q ∈ A grd is charged for at most 2d max times its assigned value, implying that
This finishes the proof.
Unfortunately, the preceding algorithm still cannot guarantee a bound on the value-efficiency for all possible games. Consider a set-cover instance with one set that costs 1 + and k bids 1/k, 1/k − 1, · · · , 1/2, 1. Clearly, A opt has efficiency approximately H k ln k. The preceding algorithm gives 0 since the set is not 'individiually affordable' for any d. It remains an interesting future work to design mechanisms that guarantee a certain bound on value-efficiency for all set-cover games.
To compute the payment of each element e i for its assigned bid, we use an algorithm similar to Algorithm 3. The only differences are:
• in Line 3 we compute the modified values for the sets;
• in Line 5 we replace v j − b i,1 by the modified value of S j after bid b i,1 is removed (or, equivalently, b i,1 is considered to be 0); • in Line 12, e i has to raise its bid b i,1 not only to make sure that S t is individually affordable, but also to let b i,1 become one of the largest d bids in S t , for some d > 0 such that S t is individually affordable by d bids; • in Line 16, e i has to raise its bid b i,1 to make sure that the modified value of a certain set S j e i is larger than the modified value of the set S t currently being selected. Furthermore when an element e i is covered by a set that is individually affordable by d elements, then the bid of e i cannot be less than c j /d for some S j , which is not necessarily the set covering e i . Thus, we know the payment by element e i is at least c j /d, which prevents free-riders.
Multi-cover Games
Theorem 3 and Theorems 5, 6 can easily be extended to the case of multi-cover. However, when it comes to computing payments, there is a problem: in the multi-cover case, an element can lie in different ways, and it may not be of its best interest if it achieves the maximum utility in the first bid (or the last bid). In that case, how can we compute payments efficiently? In this section we study the multi-cover games.
To overcome the computational complexity of computing payments, we need to instead use a different greedy algorithm to compute the outcome of the game. This algorithm is the same as Algorithm 3 of [14] . For the completeness of our presentation, we include it (with minor notational changes) as Algorithm 5 here.
In [14] it is shown that this mechanism produces an outcome with a total cost no more than ln d max times the total cost of an optimal outcome. In the following we show that the outcome is also approximately efficient with respect to the total valuation of the assigned (covered) bids.
Theorem 7 Algorithm 5 (Algorithm 3 of [14]) defines a budget-balanced and strategyproof mechanism. Further, it is
1 d max H dmax -efficient,
if all sets are individually affordable initially.
Proof. The budget-balance part is obvious. The proof for strategyproofness is the same as in [14] . In the following we prove that this mechanism is
efficiency. Let S k be a set in A opt . When Algorithm 5 finishes, at least one bid assigned to S k in A opt must have been assigned to a set in A grd . Otherwise, due to the monotonicity of the bids, for each element e i , the currently available bids should be at least the ones assigned to S k in A opt . This implies that S k is still individually affordable, a contradiction.
Let B k = {b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b x } be all x bids assigned to S k in A opt and without loss of generality let B k = {b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b y } be the subset of B k containing all bids already assigned to sets in A grd right after S k becomes individually unaffordable. For our convenience, we assume that
On the other hand, we claim that b y belongs to a subset of S k that makes S k individually affordable; otherwise, losing B k will not make S k individually unaffordable. Hence, we have 1)
Let S a k be the set in A grd that is assigned with bid b y . Then we can "charge"
The above bound is tight. We may construct an example with d 2 max elements,
Obviously all these sets are individually affordable at the beginning. Algorithm 5 picks set S dmax+1 first, because its average shared cost, which is 1 2 , is the smallest among all sets. However, once S d max +1 is added into A grd , none of the remaining sets is individually affordable, and thus the algorithm terminates with an assignment with a value d max ·(1+ ). The optimal assignment is to select sets S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S dmax , with a total value of d 2 max · (H dmax + ).
Selfish Service Providers and Receivers
So far, we assume that the cost of each set is publicly known or each set will truthfully declare its cost. In practice, it is possible that each set could also be a selfish agent that will maximize its own benefit, i.e., it will provide the service only if it receives a payment by some elements (not necessarily the elements covered by itself) large enough to cover its cost. In [14] , Li et al. designed several truthful payment schemes to selfish sets such that each set maximizes its utility when it truthfully declares its cost and the covered elements will pay whatever a charge computed by the mechanism. They also designed a payment sharing scheme that is budget-balanced and in the core.
To complete the study, in this section, we study the scenario when both the sets and the elements are individual selfish agents: each set S j has a privately known cost c j , while each element e i has a privately known bid b i,r for the r-th unit of service it shall receive and is willing to pay for it only if the assigned cost is at most b i,r . It is well-known that a cross-monotone cost sharing scheme implies a strategyproof mechanism [15] . Unfortunately, since the sets are selfish agents, it is impossible to design any cost-sharing scheme here, and the best we can do is to design some payment sharing scheme. It was shown in [21] that a cross-monotone payment sharing scheme does not necessarily induce a strategyproof mechanism by using multicast as a running example: a relay node could lie its cost upward or downward to improve its utility.
Given a subset of elements T ⊆ U and their coverage requirement r i for e i ∈ T , a collection of multisets S, and each set S j ∈ S with cost c j , let M S be a strategyproof mechanism for selfish elements that will determine which sets from S will be selected to provide the coverage to all elements T , and the payment p j to each set S j . We assume that the mechanism is normalized: the payment to a unselected set S j is always 0. Based on two monotonic output methods, the traditional greedy set cover method (denoted as GRD) and the least cost set method (denoted as LCS) for each element, Li et al. [14] designed two strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games.
Let E(S j , c, T, M S ) be the set of elements covered by S j in the output of M S . In the remaining of the paper, we assume that the mechanism M S satisfies the property that if a set S j increases its cost then the set of elements covered by S j in the output of M S will not increase, i.e., E(S j , c|
, each agent k = j reports its cost c k except that agent j reports cost d. This property is satisfied by all methods currently known for set cover games.
Let ξ i,j (T ) be the shared payment by element e i for its jth copy when the set of elements to be covered is T , given a strategyproof payment scheme M S to all sets. Following the method described in [15] , given the set U of n elements and their bids B 1 , · · · , B n we can compute the outcomeŨ (ξ, B) as the limit of the following inclusion monotonic sequence:
}. Notice that here we have to recompute the payments to all sets, and thus the shared payments by all elements, when the set of elements to be covered changed from S t to S t+1 . In other words, we define a mechanism M E (ξ) associated with the payment sharing method ξ as follows: the set of elements to be covered is U (ξ, B) , the charge to the j-th copy of element e i is ξ i,j (Ũ (ξ, B) ) if e i ∈Ũ (ξ, B) ; otherwise its charge is 0. Based on the strategyproof mechanism using LCS as output for set cover games, Li et al. [14] designed a payment sharing mechanism that is budget-balanced, cross-monotone, and in the core.
In the remaining of the paper, we assume that for the payment-sharing mechanism ξ, the payment p j to the set S j is only shared among the elements, i.e., E(S j , c, T, M S ), covered by S j . This property is satisfied by the paymentsharing methods studied in [14] for set cover games.
For the set cover games, we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 8 For set cover games with selfish sets and elements, a strategyproof mechanism M S to sets and a cross-monotone payment sharing scheme ξ for elements imply that in mechanism M E each set S j cannot improve its utility by lying upward its cost.
Proof. At current moment, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that any set does not change its declared cost. Thus, the payment to each set will not change. Since the payment sharing scheme is cross-monotone, any group of elements cannot change their bids to increase the utility of some elements without decreasing the utility of some other elements in this group. We then show that each set indeed does not have incentives to lie about its cost upward. Notice that since the payment scheme to each set is strategyproof by assumption, any set cannot lie about its cost to increase its payment when it is selected to cover some elements. In other words, its utility cannot be increased as long as it is selected in the final outcome. Consequently, the only scenario that a selfish set S j may increase its utility is that (1) it is selected to cover some elements initially when it declares its true cost c j and each element e i is assumed to have an infinitely large bid b i,j ; 3 (2) it is not selected if it declares its true cost c j because the corresponding charges to some elements are not affordable, i.e., larger than the bids of elements; 4 and (3) it will be selected if it declares a false cost c j , i.e., the corresponding charges will be no more than the bids of elements. We will show that this is impossible if c j > c j .
Assume that the declared costs of all sets other than S j are fixed and the declared bids of all elements are fixed. Let p j be the payment to set S j . Since the payment scheme to sets are strategyproof, p j is independent of its declared cost. If the set S j lies its cost upward as c j > c j , then the set of elements that will be covered by S j is only a subset of the elements previously covered by S j . Since the payment p j to S j is only shared among elements E(S j , c| j c j , T, M S ), the crossmonotonicity of the payment-sharing method ξ implies that the shared payment of each element e i in E(S j , c| j c j , T, M S ) is not smaller than its shared payment if S j did not lie its cost. Remember that the set S j is not affordable when it reports its cost c j , i.e., the total amount of bids of elements in E(S j , c, T, M S ) for their copy covered by S j is less than p j . Consequently, the set S j is still not affordable when it reports its cost as c j > c j . This finishes the proof.
Unfortunately, for set cover games, we show that a strategyproof mechanism M S to sets and a cross-monotone payment sharing scheme ξ do not induce a strategyproof mechanism M E for each element. Figure 2 illustrates such an example when LCS is used as the output, a set s j can lie its cost downward to improve its utility from 0 to p j −c j . A similar example can be constructed when the traditional greedy method is used as the output. When set S 2 is truthful, although LCS will select it to cover element e 1 with payment p 2 = 5, but the corresponding sharing by e 1 is ξ 1 = 5, which is larger than its bid b 1,1 = 4. Consequently, set S 2 will not be selected and element e 1 will not be covered (see Figure 2 (c) ). On the other hand, if S 2 lies its cost downward to c 2 = 2, its payment is still p 2 = 5, but now, since it covers elements e 1 and e 2 , the shared payments by e 1 and e 2 become ξ 1 = 3.5 and ξ 2 = 1.5. Thus, the set S 2 becomes affordable by elements e 1 and e 2 .
We leave it as future work to study whether there exists a strategyproof mechanism to select selfish sets to cover selfish elements using the combination of a strategyproof mechanism for sets, and a good payment-sharing method for elements. Notice that since this is still a binary-demand game [11] , any truthful mechanism must use an output method that is monotone for both the sets and the elements: when a selected set decreases its cost, it will still be selected to provide service; when a selected receiver increases its bid, it will still be selected to receive service.
Simulation Studies
In this paper, we presented three different mechanisms for single-cover setcover-games. Mechanism 1 (called method 1 in Figures 3 and 4) is based on a cross-monotone cost-sharing scheme and thus is budget-balanced and groupstrategyproof. However, in the worse case it cannot be α-efficient for any α > 0. Mechanism 2 (called method 2 in our simulations) based on Algorithm 2 and 3 produces an output that has a total valuation at least We conducted extensive simulations to study the actual total valuations of all these three methods compared with the total valuations of all elements in this game. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate our simulation results. In our simulations, we run 1000 instances for each setting and then take the average performances of these 1000 instances as a point plotted in the figures. We either fixed the number n of elements or the number of sets. In Figure 3 , we fixed the number of sets to 50. In Figure 3 (a), we set the element cost as a real number between 0 and 1; the number of elements per set is randomly chosen between [ In all our simulations, we found that the first mechanism (based on cost-sharing) and the second mechanism have similar efficiencies in practice. Remember that the second mechanism has a theoretically proven efficiency bound while there is no bound for the first mechanism. As expected, the third mechanism always produces an output that has less total valuations than the other two methods since it only picks sets that are individually affordable.
Conclusion
Strategyproof mechanism design has attracted a significant amount of attentions recently in several research communities. In this paper, we focused the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents with privately known valuations of being covered. We presented several (approximately budget-balanced) strategyproof mechanisms that are approximately efficient, which are summarized in Table 1 . When the service providers (i.e. sets) are also selfish, we show that a cross-monotonic payment-sharing scheme does not necessarily induce a strategyproof mechanism. This is a sharp contrast to the well-known fact [15] that a cross-monotonic cost-sharing scheme always implies a strategyproof mechanism. This paper does not intend to solve all problems related to designing strategyproof mechanisms for set cover games. There are several interesting and also important problems left open for future works.
1. Whether the approximation bounds of efficiency given by several strategyproof mechanisms are tight? Notice that we showed that these bounds are tight for these mechanisms presented here. It is unknown whether there exist some other mechanisms with asymptotically better approximation bounds on efficiency. 2. It is well-known that there is no mechanism that is both efficient and budget-balanced. Then what is the best possible tradeoffs between the efficiency and the budget-balance. Is there any bound on α · β for an α-efficient and β-budget-balanced mechanisms for set cover games? We know for sure that
≤ α · β < 1 when the original optimal solution only admits individually affordable sets. 3. What are the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for a strategyproof mechanism M S for selfish sets and a payment sharing scheme ξ such that the induced mechanism M E discussed in Section 5 is strategyproof? 4. The last question is, when both the providers and the elements are selfish agents, to design a strategyproof mechanism (not necessarily using the approach discussed in Section 5) that is approximately efficient. Remember that the total efficiency of an output of this game now becomes the total valuation of selected to-be-covered elements minus the total cost of the selected sets that cover these elements.
